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CRIMINAL LAW-THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
JURY-WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT EXAMINES THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") have been an inte-
gral part of the criminal justice system at the national level for almost
twenty years. Their enactment limited judicial discretion in sentencing and
was seen as a method for reducing the insidious results of disparate, unfair
sentences based on race, geography, judicial temperament, politics, and a
host of other factors.' Their enactment also worked as a check on the defen-
dant's right to trial by jury, enshrined in both our Nation's heritage and
governing document. 2 Although determinate sentencing ushered in an effi-
cient and convenient means of sentencing criminal defendants, it slowly
eroded the importance of the jury in the judicial system. William Blackstone
wrote,
[H]owever convenient these [new methods of trial] may appear at first..
. yet let it be again remembered, that delays, and little inconveniences in
the forms of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their
liberty in more substantial matters; that these inroads upon this sacred
bulwark of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our
constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradu-
ally increase and spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the3
most momentous concern.
This note examines the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Booker4 and its application to the Guidelines. This note begins by relaying
the underlying facts of defendants Booker and Fanfan.i Next, it explores the
different approaches to sentencing utilized by England and America from
the eighteenth century to modem times.6 Then, it turns to the Court's rea-
soning and holding in the Booker case.7 Finally, it discusses possible prob-
lems and solutions to the Court's decision.8
1. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 1.3 (3d ed. 2004).
2. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in
an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 33, 57 (2003).
3. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343-44.
4. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
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II. FACTS
The Court accepted two cases dealing with the constitutionality of the
Guidelines and combined them on appeal. This section discusses the facts
and procedural history of both cases. The first case is United States v.
Booker9 and the second is United States v. Fanfan.l0
A. Freddie Booker
1. The Trial Court
On February 26, 2003, Freddie Booker sold drugs to a customer at the
apartment of "Eric" in Beloit, Wisconsin. I' The arresting officers, respond-
ing to a criminal trespass complaint, knocked on the apartment door and
witnessed the customer's attempt to swallow a small amount of cocaine.
12
The police arrested and detained Booker outside the apartment. 13 After a
search, the officers located a duffle bag that Booker admitted was his. 14 The
bag contained approximately ninety-two grams of crack cocaine, $400, and
drug paraphernalia. 15 After his arrest, Booker admitted that he had sold an-
other 566 grams of crack cocaine.'
6
On March 13, 2003, Booker was indicted in the Western District of
Wisconsin on counts of possession with intent to distribute more than fifty
grams of cocaine base 17 and distribution of an unspecified quantity of co-
caine base, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 18 The jury found
Booker guilty of both counts. 19
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. United States v. Booker, No. 03-CR-026-S, 2003 WL 23142271, at *1 (W.D. Wis.
Sept. 5, 2003).





16. Id. At trial, Booker denied making a written statement to the police regarding the
additional 566 grams of cocaine, and the police could not independently corroborate the
allegation. Respondent Freddie J. Booker's Brief in Response at 2, United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005) (No. 04-104).
17. "Cocaine base" means "crack." "Crack" is the street name for a form of cocaine
base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and
usually appearing in a lumpy, rock-like form. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES §
2D1.1 (West 2005).





Because Booker was found guilty at trial, the statute set a minimum
sentence of ten years in prison and a maximum sentence of life.20 After trial,
the pre-sentence report recommended that Booker be held responsible for
possession of the ninety-two grams of crack cocaine located in his bag.2'
This recommendation would have resulted in an offense level of thirty-
two.22 The pre-sentence report later indicated that Booker's relevant conduct
should also include the 566 grams of cocaine that he admitted selling. 23 Un-
der the Guidelines, this higher amount resulted in a base offense level of
24 Adtoa h or onthirty-six. Additionally, the trial court found that Booker had perjured
himself at trial and increased his base offense level by two points to thirty-
eight under the obstruction of justice provisions of the Guidelines.25 Booker
had twenty-three prior convictions, resulting in a criminal history category
of VI.26 Given Booker's criminal history category and a base offense level
of thirty-eight, the Guidelines set his sentencing range at 360 months to life
imprisonment.27 The trial court sentenced Booker to 360 months in prison,
to be followed by five years of supervised release.28 Without the two addi-
tional findings made by the judge, the Guidelines would have set a range of
210 to 262 months in prison.
29
3. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Six days after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Blakely v. Wash-
ington,30 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered both parties to file
briefs addressing the applicability of Blakely's holding to the present case.3 '
Booker argued that his sentencing range should be determined solely on the
jury finding him guilty of possessing ninety-two grams of crack cocaine, not
the judge's finding that he possessed an additional 566 grams and that he
20. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005).
21. Petition at 2, Booker (No. 04-104).
22. Id. at 3. The Guidelines assign an offense level to all federal criminal statutes. De-
termination of the offense level is the first step in sentencing a defendant under the Guide-
lines. See infra Part III.C.2.
23. Petition at 3, Booker (No. 04-104).
24. Respondent Freddie J. Booker at 2, Booker (No. 04-104).
25. Id.
26. Petition at 3, Booker (No. 04-104). See infra Part III.C.2.
27. Petition at 3, Booker (No. 04-104).
28. Id. at 2.
29. Respondent Freddie J. Booker at 2, Booker (No. 04-104).
30. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
31. Petition at 3, Booker (No. 04-104).
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obstructed justice.32 A divided appellate panel agreed, holding that the trial
court's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment, and remanded the case to
the trial court to either sentence Booker within the sentencing range sup-
ported by the jury's verdict or hold a separate sentencing hearing before a
jury.33 The Government appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.4
B. Duncan Fanfan
1. The Trial Court
Duncan Fanfan was arrested after arriving at a Burger King restaurant
to sell cocaine to Donovan Thomas, a government informant. 35 Narcotics
agents found 1.25 kilograms of cocaine and 281.6 grams of cocaine base in
Fanfan's vehicle.36 On June 11, 2003, a federal grand jury in the District of
Maine indicted Fanfan with conspiring to distribute and possession with
intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846.37 The jury found Fanfan guilty.38 In response to a question on the ver-
dict form, "Was the amount of cocaine 500 or more grams?," the jury
marked "Yes."39
2. Fanfan's Sentence
The pre-sentence report indicated that the evidence supported a finding
that 2.5 kilograms of cocaine powder and 281 grams of cocaine base was
relevant conduct attributable to Fanfan.40 This finding resulted in a base
offense level of thirty-four under the Guidelines.41 Additionally, the judge
added a two point enhancement based on Fanfan's role as a leader in the
criminal activity, bringing Fanfan's base offense level to thirty-six. 42 Fan-
fan's criminal history category was I, resulting in a sentencing range of 188
to 235 months in prison.43
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id.
34. United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. 956 (2004).
35. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit at 2, United States v. Fanfan, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (No. 04-105).
36. Id. See, supra note 17, for a description of cocaine base.
37. Brief in Opposition at 2, United States v. Fanfan, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (No. 04-105).
38. Id.
39. Petition at 2, Fanfan (No. 04-105).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 3. See infra Part IlI.C.2.
42. Petition at 3, Fanfan (No. 04-105).
43. Id. See infra Part III.C.2.
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Four days prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court rendered its Blakely
decision.44 Relying on Blakely, the trial judge noted, "if the reasoning of
Blakely applies here, all the jury verdict permits us to conclude in this case
is that [Fanfan] was guilty of a conspiracy and that it involved at least 500
grams of cocaine powder., 45 Based on the jury's verdict alone, Fanfan's
sentencing range under the Guidelines was sixty-three to seventy-eight
months in prison.46 The trial court sentenced Fanfan to seventy-eight
months imprisonment.47
The Government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
arguing that the trial court committed clear error.48 Shortly after the case
was docketed in the appellate court, the Government successfully sought a
writ of certiorari before judgment from the Supreme Court. 49
Ill. BACKGROUND
This section will explore the importance of the right to trial by jury at
the time of the framing. 50 Next, it will briefly explore the use of indetermi-
nate sentencing as a means of punishment and rehabilitation.5' Then, it will
trace the sentencing reform efforts of the 1980's and implementation of the
Guidelines. Finally, it will follow the development of case law leading to
the Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey53 and Blakely v.
Washington. 5
4
A. The Importance of Trial by Jury
The Framers agreed that the right to trial by jury in criminal proceed-
ings was an integral part of the Constitution's system of checks and bal-
ances. 55 Neither the executive nor the legislative branches could criminally
punish a person without the citizenry's consent. 56 This sentiment has con-
tinued and was echoed in Blakely, "[J]ust as suffrage ensures the people's
ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant
44. Petition at 3, Fanfan (No. 04-105).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id.
49. Booker, 543 U.S. at 229 (2004).
50. See infra at Part III.A.
51. See infra at Part III.B.
52. See infra at Part III.C.
53. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
54. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). See infra at Part III.D.




to ensure their control in the judiciary. 57 A jury of ordinary men works as a
check on the threat of "judicial despotism., 58 Thomas Jefferson noted,
"Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the
Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them
out of the Legislative."
59
The Framers' concern regarding wrongful punishment and judicial tyr-
anny grew out of colonial America's struggles with the English Crown.
60
On several occasions, the Crown attempted to "emasculate colonial juries"
by removing the right to jury trial for certain offences. 61 Criminal juries
were routinely used to challenge the power of the Crown to try persons for
political offenses and violations of revenue laws.62
Against this backdrop, the Framers thought it imperative that the right
to trial by jury be preserved in the Constitution. 63 Article III of the Constitu-
tion provides, "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury." 64 The Sixth Amendment guarantees "the right to . .. an
impartial jury., 65 At the time of the framing of the Constitution, trial by jury
generally meant that "the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the
shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed
by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals and
neighbours. 66
B. The Use of Indeterminate Sentencing
Substantive law primarily governed sentencing in eighteenth century
England.67 Punishment for an offense was sanction-specific; the law pro-
57. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306.
58. Booker, 543 U.S. at 238.
59. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306 (quoting 15 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (J.
Boyd ed. 1958)).
60. Barkow, supra note 2, at 57. The case of John Peter Zenger galvanized strong sup-
port for the jury as a tool against the Crown. Id. at 52. In 1734, the Royal Governor of New
York attempted to punish Zenger for criticizing the governor's administration. Id. Three
grand juries refused to indict Zenger, but the governor brought a charge on the basis of an
"information." Id. At trial, Zenger's attorney argued that the jury had the right to determine
both the law and fact of the case. Id. The jury could conclude that the truthfulness of Zen-
ger's statements provided a ground for acquittal, even though the law provided for no such
defense. Id. The jury returned a verdict of acquittal. Id.
61. Id. at 52. While the Stamp Act gained its notoriety for taxation without representa-
tion, it also provided that violators of the act would be tried in the admiralty courts of Lon-
don. Id. at 53.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 34.
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
66. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477.
67. Id. at 479.
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vided a particular sentence for a particular crime. 68 Usually, a conviction for
a felony resulted in death.69 At this time, the trial judge in England exer-
cised little authority over the sentence, unless he thought it unjustly harsh.7°
"The judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their
determination or sentence, but the determination and sentence of the law. '7 1
As the use of capital and corporal punishment was limited, the use of
incarceration became more prevalent.72 In both England and colonial Amer-
ica, sentencing judges exercised wide discretion in determining the length of
punishment,73 so long as the sentence was "imposed within limits fixed by
law.' '74 The earliest criminal statutes of this country set the pattern of estab-
lishing a minimum and maximum term of imprisonment for varying of-
fenses.75 In the federal system, sentencing authority was vested in the trial
judge; the jury had no role in the process.76 During this time, the trial
judge's determination of sentence was subject to limited appellate review.77
Mitigating or aggravating factors relating to the underlying crime and
the offender tempered the use of the trial court's discretion.78 Beginning in
the nineteenth century and continuing into most of the twentieth, rehabilita-
tion 79 was the primary model for sentencing.80 Each sentence was to be tai-
68. Id.
69. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, § 1.2. In addition to serious crimes, such as murder, eight-
eenth century England mandated death for felling trees in an avenue or park, setting a corn-
field on fire, and shooting a rabbit. Id. Some capital sentencing laws were very specific as to
the manner of death for a particular crime. Id. Men convicted of treason were hanged. Id.
Before they died, however, they were removed from the noose and disemboweled. Id. Fi-
nally, their corpses were beheaded and quartered. Id. Treasonous women, on the other hand,
were simply burned alive. Id.
70. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
71. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396 [emphasis added].
72. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, § 1.2.
73. KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 9 (The U. Chi. Press 1998).
74. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
75. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 73, at 9. In 1789, the first Congress provided that
upon conviction of bribery of a customs official, the defendant "shall... be punished by fine
or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court.. ., so as the fine shall not exceed
one thousand dollars, and the term of imprisonment shall not exceed twelve months." ld.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 15. In Lyon's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1183, 1185 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798), the circuit judge
sentenced the defendant to four months imprisonment and a fine of $1,000, both well below
the statutory maximum. The judge stated that he would have ordered a heftier sentence, but
the reduced condition of the defendant's estate was seen as a mitigating factor. Id. Also, in
United States v. Randall, a postal employee was sentenced to a near minimum sentence for
theft of the mails based on his "former good reputation," that this was his first offense,
"temptation which in an evil hour, for yourself and friends caused you to stumble and fall,"
and the small amount stolen. 27 F. Cas. 696 (D.C.D. Or. 1869) (No. 16,118).
79. Rehabilitation is "the process of seeking to improve a criminal's character and out-
look so that he or she can function in society without committing other crimes." BLACK'S
2006]
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lored to maximize the offender's chances of rehabilitation. 1 In Williams v.
New York,82 the Supreme Court approved the rehabilitative model and the
historic practice of wide judicial discretion in sentencing matters.83 The
Court stated, "the belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal
category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and
habits of a particular offender., 84 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not require judges to abandon their reliance on out-of-court
information for sentencing purposes. 85 Rehabilitation justified the sentenc-
ing judge's discretion and allowed the judge to be free from any procedural
trial rules that might frustrate his use of that discretion. 86 This rationale
dominated sentencing systems until the latter part of the twentieth century.
87
C. The Institution of Determinate Sentencing
1. The Guidelines
Criticism of indeterminate sentencing increased during the late 1970s
and early 1980s.88 Some objected to the rehabilitative model of sentencing89
and others to the apparent inequities of sentencing some offenders to longer
terms than others for the same crime.90 Disparity and discrimination were
increasingly used to describe indeterminate sentences. 91 Indeterminate sen-
tencing was also viewed as a contributing factor to rising crime rates.92 This
criticism led many states, and the federal government, to adopt determinate
sentencing systems.
93
LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (8th ed. 2004).
80. Douglas A. Berman, The Roots and Realities of Blakely, 19 CRIM. JUST. 5, 7 (2005).
81. Id.
82. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and
recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at 242. Based on a pre-sentence report
prepared by the court's probation department and evidence not introduced at trial, the judge
sentenced the defendant to death. Id.
83. Berman, supra note 80, at 7.
84. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
85. Id. at 250-51.
86. Berman, supra note 80, at 7.
87. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, § 1.3.
88. Id.
89. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 73, at 30.
90. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, § 1.3.
91. Id. Studies demonstrated that non-rehabilitative factors, such as race and sex, were





The federal government adopted determinate sentencing for all federal
offenses in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 94 commonly
referred to as the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA).95 The SRA established the
United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") as an independent
agency within the judicial branch. 96 Congress created the Commission as an
independent agency to shield sentencing decisions from "raw politics."
97
The mission of the Commission is to develop guidelines "that will further
the basic purposes of criminal punishment, i.e., deterring crime, incapacitat-
ing the offender, providing just punishment, and rehabilitating the of-
fender."98 Congress created the Commission with three goals in mind.99 The
first goal, honesty, was designed to avoid the confusion and uncertainty that
plagued indeterminate sentencing. 100 Second, Congress required uniformity
in sentencing for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders.' 0' Finally,
Congress sought proportionality through a system that imposes appropri-
ately different sentences for conduct of different severity.0 2
2. How the Guidelines Work
The Commission set up a rather complicated formula for calculating
the determinate sentences for convicted offenders. 10 3 There are essentially
six steps to the process. First, the judge selects the guideline that most
closely matches the offense in question to determine the initial number of
points or the base offense level. °4 Second, the judge determines whether
that number should be increased or decreased based on specific offense
characteristics.105 Third, adjustments should be made, lowering or raising
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (2000).
95. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, § 4.6.
96. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lAl.1, introductory cmt. (West 2005).
97. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 728 (2005). Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy, a leading proponent of sentencing reform, stated that is was not "likely
that Congress could avoid politicizing the entire sentencing issue." Edward Kennedy, To-
ward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law With Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353,
380 (1979).





103. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, § 4.6.
104. Id. The Guidelines assign each offense a point value. Id. For example, a voluntary
manslaughter conviction is worth twenty-nine points. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2A1.3 (West 2005).
105. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.1 (West 2005). These adjustments are
located within the guideline of the offense.
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the base offense level. 10 6 Fourth, the judge must decide which criminal his-
tory category is appropriate for the defendant. 10 7 Fifth, the judge locates the
sentencing range on a grid where the row for adjusted offense number inter-
sects the column for criminal history category. 10 8 In the final step, the judge
must determine if any "downward" or "upward" departures are proper.
10 9
The sentencing judge makes the factual findings using a preponderance of
the evidence standard.ll The sentencing determination may be appealed,
but the appellate court uses an abuse of discretion standard and gives defer-
ence to the trial court's factual finding."'
D. Case Law
1. Early Cases
In re Winship'12 and United States v. Gaudin"t3 provided the basis for
interpreting modem criminal statutes and sentencing procedures. In Win-
ship, the Court explicitly held that the Constitution of the United States pro-
tected every criminal defendant "against conviction except upon proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."' 14 Due process required the State to bear the burden
of persuasion before a defendant lost his liberties." 5 Gaudin held that a
criminal defendant may demand that a jury determine his guilt as to every
element of the crime with which he is charged." 1
6
The Court, in Jones v. United States,"7 addressed whether provisions
of the federal carjacking statute" l8 constituted substantive elements of the
106. Id. Depending upon the victim's status, the offender's role in the crime, whether the
defendant obstructed justice, whether there were multiple counts, or whether the offender
accepted responsibility, the level should increase or decrease. Id. For example, accepting
responsibility for the crime reduces the offense level by two points. Id. at § 3E 1. 1.
107. Id. § 4A I.1. This category is based on prior convictions, sentences, and length of
time between prior convictions. Id. If the defendant has a prior conviction and was sentenced
over thirteen months, he receives three points. Id.
108. CAMPBELL, SUpra note 1, § 4.6.
109. Id. Not relevant in this determination are the offender's race, sex, national origin, or
socio-economic level. The Guidelines also provide a list of "not ordinarily relevant" classifi-
cations such as prior military service or family ties. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5H. 1-6 (West 2005).
110. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, § 4.6.
111. Id.
112. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
113. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
114. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
115. Id.
116. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 511.
117. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988). At the time of the offense, the statute read as follows:
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crime of carjacking or mere sentencing considerations.11 9 The defendant,
Nathaniel Jones, was arrested, charged, and convicted under the carjacking
statute. 120 Based on the jury's verdict alone, a fifteen year sentence was ap-
propriate. 121
The pre-sentence report recommended that the defendant be sentenced
to twenty-five years in jail given the fact that one of the victims received
serious bodily injury. 122 Jones objected on the grounds that § 2119(2), refer-
ring to serious bodily injury, was an element of the offense that was neither
charged nor proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.123 The court dis-
agreed and considered the provision a sentencing factor. 24 Finding that
serious bodily injury was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the
trial judge sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years in prison.125
On appeal, the Court looked to rules of statutory construction, rather
than constitutional concerns, to address the defendant's objection.126 By
classifying the provisions of the statutes as three separate crimes, the Court
was able to avoid the more serious question of whether the Fifth and Sixth
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a mo-
tor vehicle that has been transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign
commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by in-
timidation, or attempts to do so, shall -
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results,
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number
of years up to life, or both.
Id.
119. Jones, 526 U.S. at 231.
120. Id. at 230. Jones held up two men, with the assistance of his two confederates,
Oliver and McMillan. Id. at 229. After Jones and McMillan went through the victims' pock-
ets, Oliver struck one of the victims in the ear. Id. at 229. The victim suffered from a perfo-
rated eardrum, causing significant bleeding and permanent hearing loss. Id. at 229. Jones
made his getaway in one of the victim's car. Id. at 230. The indictment did not mention the
numbered sections of the statute concerning serious bodily injury or death and, at arraign-
ment, the magistrate judge informed him that he was faced with a maximum sentence of
fifteen years, as opposed to twenty-five years or life in prison. Id. The trial judge's instruc-
tions to the jury regarding the elements of the offense made no reference to the 'serious





125. Jones, 526 U.S. at 231. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that Congress did not intend to create three separate crimes. The appel-
late court found persuasive that the subtitle of the bill creating § 2119 was "Enhanced Penal-
ties for Auto Theft" and floor debate of the bill focused on penalties for a single carjacking
offense. United State v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 553 (9th Cir. 1995).
126. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243.
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Amendments were indifferent to treating facts that set sentencing ranges as
sentencing factors, rather than elements of the substantive crime.' 27 The
question of whether judicial fact finding was proper was left for another
day.1 28 Hinting at its concern, the majority was troubled about diminishing
the jury's role-finding guilt as to all elements of a crime beyond a reason-
able doubt-to the position of "gatekeeper," simply setting the floor of pun-
ishment that a judge may increase by finding facts by a preponderance of
the evidence. 129 In this case, the jury's finding of facts would simply be a
jumping off point, "open[ing] the door" for the trial judge to increase the
punishment from fifteen years to twenty-five years.' 30 The Court held that
the jury was required to make findings of fact that raise "the sentencing
ceiling."'
131
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia was more forthcoming and wrote, "I
am convinced that it is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the
jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed.' '132 According to Justice Scalia,
these facts are to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.1
33
2. Apprendi and Blakely
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,134 the Court addressed the question left un-
answered by Jones. The defendant in Apprendi plead guilty to two counts of
second-degree possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose and one count
of third-degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb. 35 Under
New Jersey law, a prosecutor may request an enhanced sentence, if the
crime was committed with a bias purpose, more commonly known as a
"hate crime."' 136 At sentencing, the trial judge concluded that "the crime was




130. Id. at 244.
131. Id. at 251.
132. Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 (Scalia, J. concurring).
133. Id. In dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that Congress has the power to determine
whether a sentencing factor is just that or an element of the offense. Id. at 255 (Kennedy, J.
dissenting). He argued that the majority's reading of the statute was strained. Id.
134. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
135. Id. at 469. In the early morning of December 22, 1994, the defendant, Charles Ap-
prendi, Jr., fired several bullets into the home of an African-American family that had re-
cently moved into the defendant's neighborhood. Id. Apprendi was arrested shortly after the
incident and reportedly stated that he did not want blacks in his neighborhood. Id. A grand
jury returned a twenty-three count indictment against him. Id.
136. Id. at 470.
137. Id. at 471. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, and the state
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crime finding, the defendant would have been sentenced to a maximum
concurrent sentence on all counts of twenty years. With the hate crime find-
ing, the defendant's maximum sentenced increased to thirty years.' 1
38
The Court was directly confronted with the question of whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that a jury or a
judge make a factual determination increasing a maximum sentence. The
Court stated, "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that in-
creases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' 139 In
reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on the importance of the jury
at common law. 140 Classifying facts needed for increased punishment as
sentencing factors, thus taking the decision away from the jury, worked as a
threat to the jury system and due process.' 4 1 It is important to note that Ap-
prendi dealt with findings that exceeded statutory maximums, rather than
sentencing ranges within the statutory allowance.
Many observers believed that the limits of the Court's decision in Ap-
prendi would not reach or alter modem sentencing practices. 142 When the
Court granted certiorari in Blakely v. Washington,143 most lower courts had
decided that Apprendi was inapplicable to judicial fact finding that simply
determined guideline sentencing outcomes within statutory ranges.' 44 The
Court's decision in Blakely would prove otherwise.
In Blakely, the defendant, Ralph Blakely, Jr., plead guilty to kidnap-
ping his wife. 145 The facts admitted during his allocution warranted a stan-
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id.
138. Id. at 470.
139. Id. at 490.
140. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484. Commenting on the importance of the jury trial guaran-
tee in Article III of the Constitution, a New Hampshire farmer warned of the need "to guard
with the most jealous circumspection against the introduction of new, and arbitrary methods
of trial, which, under a variety of plausible pretenses, may in time, imperceptibly undermine
this best preservative of LIBERTY." THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES,
SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 477 (N. Cogan ed. 1997).
141. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at476.
142. Berman, supra note 80, at 9.
143. Blakely v. Washington, 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), cert. granted, 540 U.S.
965 (2003).
144. Berman, supra note 80, at 9.
145. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299 (2004). Blakely apparently suffered from
psychological and personality disorders and had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophre-
nia. Id. at 298. In 1998, Blakely abducted his wife, Yolanda. Id. In the process, he bound her
with duct tape and forced her into a wooden box in the bed of his truck at knifepoint. Id.
When the Blakelys' son returned home from school that day, Blakely ordered him to follow
in another car or Blakely would shoot Yolanda with a shotgun. Id. The boy escaped and
sought help at a gas station the two cars had visited. Id. Blakely drove Yolanda to a house in
Montana where he was subsequently arrested. Id.
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dard sentence range of fifty-three months. 14 6 The trial judge imposed a
ninety month sentence after finding that the defendant acted with "deliber-
ate cruelty.' 47 Under Washington State's sentencing scheme, "deliberate
cruelty" was a ground for departing from the standard sentencing range.1
4 8
The Court held that the imposition of the additional sentence violated
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial when the facts support-
ing the deliberate cruelty finding were neither admitted by the defendant nor
found by the jury. 49 The maximum sentenced allowed, under Apprendi's
rule, "is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."'"5 It is
immaterial that the exceptional sentence could not exceed the statutory
maximum of ten years. 5 ' The statutory maximum "is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maxi-
mum he may impose without any additional findings.' 52 In Blakely's case,
the maximum sentence supported by his guilty plea was fifty-three months.
The jury's verdict alone must authorize the sentence, not additional findings
made by a judge. 153
The majority made clear that its holding in Blakely did not address the
constitutionality of determinate sentencing, rather it addressed how deter-
minate sentencing operates and complies with the Sixth Amendment. 154 The
Blakely case articulated an application of Apprendi that "reflects not just
respect for long-standing precedent, but the need to give intelligible content
to the right of a jury trial. That right is no mere procedural formality, but a
fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure." 155 The
Court stated that a defendant has the right to demand that the State prove to
a jury all the facts legally essential to his punishment.156
In dissent, Justice O'Connor noted that the majority's holding cast
doubt on the validity of the Guidelines and twenty years of sentencing re-
146. Id. at 299. The defendant plead guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving do-
mestic violence and use of a firearm. Id. State law prescribed a maximum sentence for sec-
ond-degree kidnapping of ten years. Id. However, under Washington's Sentencing Reform
Act, the offense carried a standard punishment range of forty-nine to fifty-three months. Id.
147. Id. at 300. Under Washington's Guidelines, the judge may depart from the standard
range if he finds "substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A. 120(2) (West 2000).
148. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300.
149. Id. at 303.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 304.
152. Id. at 303-04.
153. Id. at 305.
154. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308.
155. Id. at 305-06.
156. Id. at 313.
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form. 15 7 She concluded that Blakely's application of Apprendi's rule would
lead to a consolidation of sentencing power in the judiciary. 5 8 Justice
O'Connor, later reflecting on the significance of Blakely, described it as a
"No. 10 earthquake.' 59
IV. REASONING
United States v. Booker presented two separate issues for the Court.
60
First, whether the Sixth Amendment was violated when facts necessary for
sentencing under the Guidelines were found by the judge, rather than the
jury.'16 Second, if the answer to the first question was "yes," whether the
Guidelines were inapplicable. 62 Two separate majorities of the Court an-
swered these questions.' 
63
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury
In his opinion, Justice Stevens briefly described the litany of cases
leading to the Court's holding in Blakely. 64 He then went on to discuss the
statutory language requiring judges to follow the Guidelines with little
power to depart from them. 65 Finally, he rejected three arguments offered
by the Government to distinguish the Guidelines from the state sentencing
scheme struck down in Blakely.
166
1. Groundwork Cases
The Court began by addressing previous cases relating to its decision
in Blakely.167 Relying on In re Winship, Jones, and Apprendi,168 the Court
determined that the right to trial by jury is implicated "whenever a judge
seeks to impose a sentence that is not solely based on 'facts reflected in the
157. Id. at 314 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Berman, supra note 80, at 5.
160. Booker, 543 U.S. at 228.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court as to the first question. He was
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 226. Justice Breyer delivered
the opinion of the Court as to the second question. He was joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg. Id. at 244.
164. Id. at 230-33.
165. Id. at 234.
166. Booker, 543 U.S. at 235-37.
167. Id. at 230.
168. See infra Part III.D.
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jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."",169 For Apprendi purposes, the
"statutory maximum" is the "maximum sentence a judge may impose solely
on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the de-
fendant.' 170
2. The Mandatory Nature of the Guidelines
No Sixth Amendment violation would exist if the Guidelines were ad-
visory, rather than mandatory.' 7' The selection of a sentencing range based
on a particular set of facts would have been consistent with the trial judge's
broad authority and discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory
range. 72 Section 3553(b) of the Guidelines directs that the court "shall im-
pose a sentence of the kind, and within the range" established by the Guide-
lines. 73 The Court had previously held that the Guidelines have the force
and effect of laws. 1
74
The limited ability of the trial judge to depart from the Guidelines does
not suggest that he is bound only by the statutory minimum and maxi-
mum. 175 The Court stated that the trial judge is bound to impose the sen-
tence called for in the Guidelines, and, in most cases, the Guidelines have
taken into account almost every possible factor that could be used to de-
part.176 The facts of both Booker and Fanfan reflect the mandatory nature of
the Guidelines. 77 Justice Stevens noted that both were run-of-the-mill drug
cases that did not present the trial judge with an opportunity to adjust the
sentence upward or downward based on the facts of the case after the rele-
vant offense range was calculated. 
78
Sentencing factors had the effect of concentrating sentencing power
with the judge. 179 The role of the jury diminished as the judge was charged
with setting the upper limits of sentencing.' 80 Depending on the factor and
its corresponding punishment, the jury's finding of the underlying crime
became less important. 181 The Sixth Amendment requires the jury to stand
169. Booker, 543 U.S. at 232.
170. Id. at 228.




175. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
176. Id.




181. Booker, 543 U.S. at 236. In his opinion, Justice Stevens provided several examples
of extraordinary enhancements away from the jury's findings. Id. at 752. In United States v.
[Vol. 28
CRIMINAL LAW
between the defendant and the power of the government under the sentenc-
ing system.'
82
3. The Government's Position
The Government advanced three arguments distinguishing the holding
in Blakely from the Guidelines. 183 First, the Government argued that a
commission rather than the legislature, as in Washington's sentencing
scheme, adopted the Guidelines. 8 4 Second, stare decisis required the Court
to follow earlier decisions that were inconsistent with Blakely.185 Finally,
the Government contended that Blakely's holding presented a separation of
powers issue.
1 86
The majority quickly dismissed the Government's first argument, stat-
ing that it "lack[ed] constitutional significance."' 187 Regardless of whether a
commission or Congress determined that a fact should increase a defen-
dant's sentence, a judge, not the jury, was still making that determination.188
The Court noted that the principles it sought to defend were applicable to
the Guidelines.189 The right to trial by jury sought to limit judicial power
"that could arise from 'arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convic-
tions." 90
The Court also quickly dismissed the Government's stare decisis ar-
gument.' 9' The Government cited four cases that it argued were inconsistent
with Blakely.192 In United States v. Dunnigan,193 the Court held that the
guideline provision requiring a judge to increase a sentence based on per-
jured testimony did not violate the defendant's right not to testify on her
own behalf.' 94 The question of whether the perjury factor increased the de-
fendant's sentence above the sentencing range found by the jury's facts was
Rodriguez, 73 F.3d 161 (7th Cir. 1996), the court increased the defendant's sentence from
fifty-four months to life imprisonment. In United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 362 (4th
Cir. 2004), the trial court increased the defendant's sentence from fifty-seven month to 155
years.




186. Id. at 238.
187. Id.




192. Id. at 239.
193. 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
194. Id. at 98.
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not addressed.1 95 The trial judge may take into account such testimony if it
does so within the statutory range.'
96
In Witte v. United States,197 the Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause' 98 did not prevent a prosecution for conduct that was used to increase
a defendant's sentence on a previous conviction. 99 Witte relied on United
States v. Watts,200 which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not pre-
vent a court from considering acquitted conduct in sentencing a defen-
dant.20 Because these cases did not specifically address sentencing en-
hancements, the Court in Booker dismissed their relevance.2 °2
Finally, in Edwards v. United States,2 °3 the Court held that a jury's
finding that the defendant was involved in a conspiracy with either cocaine
or crack supported a sentencing enhancement for both drugs.2 4 The defen-
dant argued that the jury's verdict limited the judge to enhancements based
on one drug, not both.205 Justice Stevens rejected this case as well, because
it did not specifically address sentencing enhancements.
For its third point, the Government argued that any holding that re-
quired sentencing factors to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
would transform the Guidelines into a code defining criminal conduct.20 6
This would lead to an unconstitutional grant of authority to the Commission
of an inherently legislative function.20 7 The Court rejected this argument
and concluded that the Sixth Amendment would be violated whether the
enhancement facts were called "sentencing factors" or "elements" of the
208
crime. Whichever label one chooses, the jury must find the fact beyond a
reasonable doubt before it can be used to increase punishment beyond the
209sentencing range.
195. Booker, 543 U.S. at 238.
196. Id.
197. 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment states "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
Id.
199. Witte, 515 U.S. at 399.
200. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
201. Booker, 543 U.S. at 240.
202. Id.
203. 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
204. Edwards, 523 U.S. 513.




209. Id. at 755.
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B. The Appropriate Remedy
After finding that the jury, not the judge, must find facts relevant to
sentencing under the Sixth Amendment, the Court was faced with the issue
of how to apply the constitutional holding to the Guidelines. 2'0 The Court
held that the proper remedy was to sever two provisions of the SRA, which
effectively made the Guidelines advisory.21' The Court first explained why
Congress would likely prefer the total invalidation of the Guidelines to en-
grafting the Sixth Amendment requirement onto it.212 Second, the Court
explained why Congress would prefer the excision of two provisions of the
Act rather than the Act's complete invalidation.2 3
1. Severance or Addition of Sixth Amendment Requirement
The Court listed several considerations in determining that Congress
would not want the Act to remain if the Sixth Amendment requirement was
added to it.214 First, Congress intended the Guidelines to serve as an aid to
the judge, not the jury, in determining punishment.21 5 The statute requires
that "the court" should look to "the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant., 21 6 Adding the Court's
Sixth Amendment holding would require that "the judge working together
with the jury" determine sentencing.217 Congress did not intend the jury to
play such a role.218
Second, Congress's goal in implementing the Guidelines was to in-
crease uniformity in sentencing based on the defendant's real conduct.21 9
Judges rely on pre-sentence reports to relay information regarding the de-
fendant's actual conduct when he committed the crime.220 Although ele-
ments of the real conduct may not go to the jury, "conduct that is not for-
mally charged ... may enter into the determination of the applicable guide-
line sentencing range.",221 Applying the Sixth Amendment requirement to
the SRA would prevent the judge from seeking information from the pre-
210. Id.
211. Booker, 543 U.S. at 248.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 249.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 294 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1) (West 2005)).
217. Booker, 543 U.S. at 250.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 251. Examples of relevant conduct include brandishing a weapon, quantity of




sentence report and prevent sentencing based on the defendant's conduct at
the time of the offense. This would undermine Congress's goal in punishing
similar crimes in similar ways.222
Third, severing two portions of the Act would not create an overly
complex system for administering punishment under the Guidelines. 3 The
Sixth Amendment requirement would require judges, prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and juries to determine not only whether the underlying crime was
committed, but also how it was committed.224 Indictments would be too
intricate, detailing every possible act of the defendant during the commis-
sion of a crime.225 Defendants would have the difficult task of defending
several acts while simultaneously trying to establish that they were not pre-
sent at the time of the offense.226
Fourth, any Sixth Amendment requirement would undermine Con-
gress's intent to punish uniformly in plea bargaining situations. 7 The
Guidelines established policies whereby judges could fairly evaluate and
accept or reject plea bargains based on the defendant's actual conduct.228
The judge would garner such information from the pre-sentence report.
With the Sixth Amendment requirement, the prosecutor would gain a great
deal of power over the defendant's sentence without the judge providing a
moderating force.229 Prosecutors would decide which defendants merit
heavier sentences and charge accordingly.23°
Finally, Congress would not have enacted sentencing reform that made
it harder to adjust sentences upward than to adjust downward. 231 The Sixth
222. Id. at 251. The Court provided an example of Smith and Jones violating the Hobbs
Act forbidding interference with any commodity in commerce. Id. Smith threatened to injure
a victim unless the victim advanced a few dollars, while Jones threatened the victim and the
victim's family for a larger amount of money. Id. The two committed the same crime, but
their conduct was very different. Id. Engrafting the Sixth Amendment requirement would
prevent the judge from relying on such information unless it was charged. Id. The two would
receive the same sentence for different conduct. Id.
223. Booker, 543 U.S. at 254.
224. Id.
225. Id. By way of example, the Court pondered "would the indictment have to allege, in
addition to the elements of robbery, whether the defendant possessed a firearm, whether he
brandished it, whether he threatened death, whether he caused serious bodily injury... ?" Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 255.
228. Id. at 255.
229. Booker, 543 U.S. at 255.
230. Id. at 257. In Booker's case, the prosecutor could elect to charge 658 grams of co-
caine, ninety-two grams, or less. Id. The judge would be unable to sentence based on




Amendment requirement would allow judges to find facts that warrant a
lower sentence but not facts that exceed the sentencing range.232
2. What Has to Go
Because the Court determined that it would be impractical to add the
Sixth Amendment requirement to the Act, it next faced the question of
which portions of the Act to sever in order to make the Act constitutional.233
Congress would prefer partial severance rather than complete invalida-
tion. 34 Those portions of the Act that are constitutionally valid, capable of
functioning independently, and consistent with Congress's goals must be
retained.235 Consequently, the Court severed § 3553(b)(1), which required
judges to sentence within the appropriate range, and § 3742(e), which re-
quired de novo review of departures from the Guidelines. 236
Removing the mandatory language from the Act satisfied Apprendi's
rule.237 The remainder of the Act functions independently. 238 It still requires
judges to take the Guidelines into account when pronouncing sentencing
and furthers Congress's goal of uniformity.239
Section 3742(e) must also be severed because of its cross-references to
§ 3553(b)(1) in the appellate process.2 40 This section required de novo re-
view of the trial court's sentencing determination in the circuit courts. 4
The Court previously held that when a statute does not explicitly set forth
the standard of review, it may do so implicitly. 242 The standard may be in-
ferred from similar statutes and the "sound administration of justice. 2 43
Prior to the enactment of § 3742(e) in 2003, appellate courts reviewed sen-
tences for correctness and reviewed those sentences falling outside the sen-
tencing range for unreasonableness. 244 Appellate courts should look to the
232. Id.
233. Id. at 258.
234. Id. at 258.
235. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
236. Id.
237. Id. "[E]veryone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by these cases would
have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the [SRA] the provisions that make
the Guidelines binding on district judges." Id. at 233 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 260 (citing Prosecutorial Remedies and Other tools to end the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21, § 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. 670).
241. Booker, 543 U.S. at 282.
242. Id. See generally Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).




factors to be considered in imposing a sentence and the reason for such im-
position by the district court.
245
3. What Remains
The remedy kept the Commission intact and allowed it to continue to
research, revise, and write new sentencing ranges, factors, and Guide-
lines.246 Congress's intent to achieve uniformity, honesty, and proportional-
ity in sentencing was maintained.247 The two cases were remanded to the
district courts for resentencing based on the Court's constitutional holding
and appropriate remedy.248
C. Dissenting Opinions
Booker included four dissenting opinions.249 The most important in-
cluded Justice Stevens's dissent as to the Court's remedy250 and Justice
Breyer's dissent from the Sixth Amendment holding.251
1. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in response to the majority's
holding that the Sixth Amendment requirement could not be successfully
added to the SRA.2  The Justice disagreed with the majority's five consid-
erations supporting severance of two portions of the Act rather than the ad-
dition of the Sixth Amendment requirement. 253 Justice Stevens's require-
ment would simply allow the judge to consider additional factors when de-
termining punishment within the sentencing range established by the jury's
findings.254 In Booker's case, had the jury found that Booker possessed 566
additional grams, the appropriate range would have been 324 to 405 months
in prison.255 The obstruction of justice finding as well as any other informa-
tion in the pre-sentence report could be used to determine Booker's sentence
245. Id.
246. Id. at 263.
247. Id.
248. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
249. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer authored dissenting opinions.
250. Booker, 543 U.S. at 272 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
251. Id. at 326 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
252. Id. at 272. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Souter and
partially by Justice Scalia. Id.
253. Id.





within the 324 to 405 sentencing range. The Guidelines combine manda-
tory sentencing and discretionary decision making by the judge in the same
system.257
Justice Stevens believed the majority inappropriately determined Con-
gress's intent and desire regarding the Guidelines and made a policy deter-
mination that was better left to Congress.5  He was critical of the Court's
severability analysis. 259 The majority's opinion did not further Congress's
goal of uniformity because the Guidelines were merely advisory.26 °
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
The same four justices have been on the losing side of the Court's
Sixth Amendment analysis in sentencing decisions over the last decade.261
The dissent disagreed with the majority's historical analysis regarding the
role of the jury in sentencing.262 Traditionally, the law has treated elements
of a crime differently than factors to be used at sentencing.263 The dissenters
were also concerned that the Sixth Amendment holding prevents Congress
and state legislatures from defining appropriate punishment.2 64
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Court's decision in United States v. Booker poses significant chal-
lenges to the operation of the federal criminal justice system. Both Booker
and Blakely have impacted the working of justice like no other cases in the
Court's criminal law jurisprudence.265 The Court's decision calls into ques-
256. Booker, 543 U.S. at 173.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 279.
260. Id. at 280.
261. The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Kennedy dissented in Jones,
Apprendi, and Blakely. Id. at 802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
262. Booker, 543 U.S. at 326-27.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 328.
265. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can The Federal Sentencing System Be
Saved? A Plea For Rapid Reversal Of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 217,
252 (2004). During a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the Blakely
decision, witnesses were asked if another case had had as big an impact on American crimi-
nal law as Blakely. Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Guidelines: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (July 13, 2004). Witnesses responded that
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), each had a constitutional impact on the criminal justice
system, but their holdings were limited to specific acts and were accompanied by clear rules.
Bowman, supra note 265, at 252.
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tion over twenty years of sentencing reform efforts at the state and national
level and leaves unresolved whether defendants sentenced under the Guide-
lines are entitled to new sentencing hearings.
A. Where Do We Go From Here?
In Blakely, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court did not find structured
sentencing unconstitutional; rather it stated how it must work within the
Sixth Amendment's framework.2 66 Booker sought to do the same. Nowhere
in the opinion did the Court explicitly rule out the continued use of determi-
nate sentencing systems. It will be left to Congress and the Executive to
implement a new system that best serves the interests expressed in the
Guidelines while complying with the Sixth Amendment.
1. Other Options
There are several sentencing options available to Congress when it
seeks to tinker with the Guidelines in light of the Booker decision. First, a
jury sentencing scheme could be established.267 In this system, the jury
would actually select a defendant's punishment within the statutory range.
The judge would play little or no part in the sentencing determination. This
system would present the same problem as indeterminate sentencing and
judicial discretion.268 A jury sentencing system is unlikely to take hold
given the fact that judges have traditionally administered sentencing at the
federal level.269 Second, Congress could enact a system whereby conviction
for a certain crime results in a particular penalty,7 ° similar to sentencing
regimes in England prior to the nineteenth century.271 This approach is simi-
larly unlikely, given Congress' desire to punish crimes based on the defen-
dant's conduct during the offense.272 Third, Congress could return to a sys-
tem of indeterminate sentencing that existed prior to the Sentencing Reform
Act's enactment in 1987.273 Finally, Congress could attempt to salvage the
Guidelines by allowing the trial judge to consider facts and utilize discretion
within the statutory or guideline range. This approach closely follows the
reasoning of Justice Stevens in his Blakely dissent. This system would re-
266. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004).
267. Bowman, supra note 265, at 258.
268. See infra Part III.C.
269. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 73, at 9.
270. Bowman, supra note 265, at 258.
271. See infra Part IH.B.
272. See infra Part III.C.
273. See infra Part III.B.
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quire post-conviction findings of fact by the judge274 but would comply with
Blakely because the judge is not increasing the sentence beyond its statutory
maximum.
2. One Last Problem
One of the most troubling issues yet to be faced is what to do with de-
fendants sentenced under the Guidelines over the last eighteen years. Justice
O'Connor, in her dissent in Blakely, forecasted the results of invalidating
state and federal sentencing systems.275 Justice O'Connor suggested that
sentences imposed after Apprendi could be exposed to collateral attack
based on the Court's precedent affecting conviction when a new rule is an-
nounced.276 Additionally, all sentences on direct appeal at the time of the
Blakely holding are in "jeopardy."2"
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Booker has left many scholars, members of Con-
gress, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, wondering what is next.
Some admired the decision, not so much for its enlightened reasoning, but
rather for dismantling of an overly harsh sentencing system.278 Others view
the decision as destroying more than twenty years of efforts to improve a
good, but flawed, sentencing scheme.279 Whatever the result, players in the
274. Bowman, supra note 265, at 258.
275. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 324 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
276. Id. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) holding that "a case announces a new
rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final." Id. at 301.
277. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2549 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Stevens held that "today's Sixth Amendment holding and the Court's remedial interpre-
tation of the Sentencing Act must be applied to all cases on direct review." Booker, 543 U.S.
at 267. Justice Stevens acknowledged that not "every sentence will give rise to a Sixth
Amendment violation" and that "courts are expected to apply ordinary prudential doctrines."
Id.




criminal justice system will have a difficult time shaping a sentencing sys-
tem that furthers the Guideline's goals of uniformity, proportionality, and
honesty while complying with the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury.
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